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The Future of Hong Kong: Not What
It Used To Be
PeterWesley-Smith!
ABSTRACT

With the re-integration of Hong Kong into the People's
Republic of China in June 1997. this Article provides an
insightful review and analysis of the history of the "Hong
Kong question"from the cession of Hong Kong island to the
British Crown in 1842 to the territory's current status in
1997. This Article begins with an overview of Hong Kong's
early colonial history, examining the acquisitionand retention
of Hong Kong by the British Government. This Article then
continues with a detailed account of the treatment of Hong
Kong, including the eventual decision to return Hong Kong to
the People's Republic of China, by both the United Kingdom
and the People's Republic of China during the post-War
period from 1945 to 1997. Finally, with Hong Kong's reintegration in the nearfuture, this Article concludes that the
future of Hong Kong rests with the idea and success of "one
country, two systems."
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I know that the Chinese people are willing to go to war
with England over Hong Kong, even if the Chinese
Government is not.
-Lin Yu-tang'

I.

INTRODUCTION

Wrested by force or threat through "unequal treaties" and at
the cost of the enduring hostility of the Chinese nation, Hong Kong
as a British colony often seemed fragile and uncertain. Much of it
was secured by a lease which would expire in 1997. Considerable

efforts were therefore made at various times in Hong Kong and the
Colonial Office to place the territory on a firmer footing, but from
1943 it seemed unlikely that even the status quo could long be
defended in the post-war world. After 1949, the central issue was
whether Hong Kong could survive at all as a British dependency on
the periphery of Communist China. This Article, based on
documents available up to the end of 1996 in the Public Record
Office in London, 2 seeks to present British attitudes towards
retention of its Far Eastern colony.

1.
Between Tears and Laughter, quoted in the draft Kitson memorandum
of 1946 referred to in infra note 24.
2.
In general. British government records are subject to the "thirty year
rule" and thus the primary material for this study stops at the mld-1960s.
Documents for 1966 were not available, and some files that had begun before
then but not yet completed remained closed: some records, usually of course the
most important, sensitive, and interesting ones, are subject to a longer period of
closure and cannot yet be consulted. The record Is thus Incomplete. As time goes
on, more and more materials are released, and therefore judgments made on what
is now available must always be subject to reconsideration. It should be noted as
well that certain matters affecting Sino-British relations in regard to Hong Kong,
such as the Walled City of Kowloon, territorial waters, the appointment of a
Chinese consular officer, administration of the boundaries, customs matters, and
construction of an airport in the New Territories, will not be discussed In this
Article. while important in their own right, and giving rise to much urgent
diplomatic activity, they did not significantly impinge on the question of the
colony's future.
This Article relies on records preserved by the British government at Kew.
These records are identified by their department (e.g. CO or Colonial Office; FO or
Foreign Office), the series to which they belong (e.g. C0129, Governor's dispatches
from Hong Kong to the Secretary of State for the Colonies: F0371, general
correspondence), and, depending on the method of storage, the number of the
volume or box or fie in which they are deposited (e.g., C0537/1656). Sometimes
there is a file within a box which is separately identified (e.g. F0371/5361 F2134).
The normal method of citation is to refer to the particular item of correspondence
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THE ACQUISITION AND RETENTION OF COLONIAL, HONG KONG:

1842-

1945

A. British Acquisition of Hong Kong
The island of Hong Kong, following the Opium War, was ceded
to the British Crown by the TYeaty of Nanjing 1842. A small strip of
territory on the opposite mainland, known as Kowloon, and
Stonecutters Island were ceded in 1860.
Cession was then
understood in international law to mean an absolute transfer of
sovereignty over the territory in perpetuity. Legal title was therefore
safe, at least until China was strong enough to demand
retrocession. The last acquisition, however, of the New Territories,
comprising rural hinterland and sea boundaries enclosing the ceded
portions, was achieved through a ninety-nine year lease in 1898.
Britain asserted sovereignty over the leasehold, though recognizing
the obligation to restore it to China in 1997. In due course, it
became clear that the ceded colony could not exist as a functioning
territorial unit without the leased addition, and the primary
objective in the first part of this century was to convert the lease
into a formal cession.
B. Proposalsto Cede the New Territories
Governors of Hong Kong were the principal movers in
advancing the cause of cession, and no opportunity which might
arise in Sino-British relations was lost. As early as 1909, Sir
Frederick Lugard suggested cession as a condition for the return of
Weihaiwei, a Chinese territory also leased in 1898 but for an
uncertain term. The Colonial Office promised to give careful
consideration to the proposal when the time came. 3 Weihaiwei was
not restored until 1930, and in the meantime Sir Cecil Clementi
revived Lugard's proposal. A Colonial Office clerk minuted, 'The
outlook is an anxious one for Hong Kong but our best chance of
saving the New Territories is to lie doggo and assume that the lease

which has initiated a file, by for example generating minutes within the
departments or institutions of government (e.g., Grantham to CO, secret, tel No
79. 26 Jan. 1949, in F0371/7539; this indicates a secret cable from the Governor
of Hong Kong to his Secretary of State on the date shown which has been copied
to the Foreign Office and stored in their files). Occasionally there will be a freestanding memorandum as the only item in a file. Various storage methods and
occasional untidiness and uncertainty appear, and thus citation cannot be an
exact science.
3.
PETERWESLEY-SMrrH, UNEQUAL TREATY 1898-1997: CHINA, GREAT BRITAIN
AND HONG KONG'S NEW TERRITORIES 155 (1980).
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will run its normal course (another 70 years)." 4 In 1929, the
Foreign Office sought the views of Sir Miles Lampson, British
Minister in Beijing, on whether the Chinese government would
accept a package of Weihaiwei. money, and certain disputed tracts
of land on the Burmese border in return for cession of the New
Territories. Lampson scorned the idea. "For us to seek now to
perpetuate or extend any existing alienation would be not only to
invite a rebellion but to concentrate active attention on issues far
better left dormant."5 The Colonial Office nevertheless wanted the
question constantly in mind in case a "less unfavourable"
opportunity should occur in the future. 6 It was pressed again in
1930 in relation to what appeared to be agreement on customs, but
Lampson remained fimily opposed. It was raised again a year later
with equal lack of favour, by Sir William Peel and by Sir Geoffry
Northcote in 1938, this time in return for a substantial loan to
China. 7 The time, however, was never ripe, and no approach to the
Chinese government was ever made.
Opinion in the Foreign Office had in any event turned against
such schemes, and once Britain was embroiled in World War II the
issue was not cession of the New Territories but whether the entire
colony should and could be preserved.
C. Retention of Hong Kong
The China specialists in the British diplomatic corps had long
had doubts about maintaining the unequal treaties, including those
by which Britain had acquired Hong Kong. In 1919. for example.
Sir John Jordan, British Minister to China, favored the

"neutralization or internationalization of all leased territories under
conditions which will secure immunity from attack and render such
terms as 'open door' and 'China's integrity' realities and not the
meaningless expressions they too often are at present."8 One of his
successors, Sir H. Seymour, in 1942 urged that Hong Kong be given
up along with extraterritorial rights in China. 9 The officials of the
Foreign Office tended to waver, sometimes supporting outright
retention, sometimes seeking to protect Hong Kong but restoring
Chinese sovereignty. Sir John Pratt, previously from the consular
service in China, argued in 1931 against annexation of the New
Territories in favor of merely preserving the water supply and

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

On Clementi to Amery, tel, 19 Jan. 1927, in F0371/12399.
Lampson to Foreign Office. tel No 534, in C0129/517/12A.
Gent to Foreign Office, 24 July 1929, inFO371/13949.
WESLEY-SMITH, supranote 3, at 155-61.
Id.at 151.
See PREM3/157/4.
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strengthening the case for preservation of the ceded colony alone.' 0
Ten years later he was prepared to abandon the entire territory.
After Japan's occupation of Hong Kong in 1941, the issue for
the British was how to formulate a post-war policy for Hong Kong.
given that the Americans under Roosevelt were hostile to British
imperialism in the Pacific and that China was likely to demand
rendition of Hong Kong as a consequence of the war. From 1941 to
1943, the trend of official opinion was in favor of accommodating
China's wishes by some compromise arrangement, such as a joint
mandatory system with the United States." In 1942, the Colonial
Office, traditionally a strong proponent of Hong Kong's retention,
suggested that after victory in the war, and assuming satisfactory
international co-operation. His Majesty's Government would be
"ready to consider with the Government of China the future position
in Hong Kong and will not for their part regard the maintenance of
British sovereignty of the Colony as a matter beyond the scope of
such discussions. They recognize that Hong Kong is geographically
an integral part of China and that the services which the port and
mart of Hong Kong can render to their ally China and to the
development of good relations between China and all the United
Nations should be the predominant factor in any reconstruction
plans."' 2 That is, Hong Kong should be returned "on terms."
There was much support for this notion, though strong
dissents were registered, and it was in general agreed that readiness
to re-cede Hong Kong would dissipate if conditions in China were
not at the time propitious. The first major test of this tentative
policy came with the Chinese counter-draft to Britain's draft treaty
for the renunciation of British extraterritorial rights in China.
Included was a demand that the New Territories convention be
terminated. Britain was not prepared to concede, even at the cost of
sacrificing the extraterritoriality treaty, but China unexpectedly
relented, being content instead with a promise that the New
Territories lease could be discussed after the war. At a conference
on Pacific relations later in 1942, Sir John Pratt, to the displeasure
of the Foreign Office, stated that he felt "confident that when the
time came to deal with Hong Kong, the Chinese would be completely
13
satisfied."
Thereafter, during the war, the Hong Kong question subsided.
China apparently believed that the deal was done, barring the
paperwork, and that the whole colony would be returned to Chinese
sovereignty once victory was won. British attitudes, however,

10.

WESLEY-SMITH, supranote 3, at 159.

11.

CHAN LAU KrT-CHING, CHINA, BRITAIN AND HONG KONG 1895-1945, 299

(1990).
12.
13.

IcL at 301.
Id. at 309; WESLEY-SMITH, supra note 3,at 161.
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gradually moved towards retention. American opinion continued to
favor the Chinese side, but its articulation was uncoordinated, and
Winston Churchill expressed adamant opposition to rendition (he
was not, he said, His Majesty's Prime Minister "to preside over the
liquidation of the British Empire").' 4 Roosevelt offered Chiang Kalshek support for the recovery of Hong Kong in return for a
representative government in China and co-operation with the
communists in the fight against Japan, hoping Chiang would make
Hong Kong an international free port. Churchill was neither
consulted nor amused, and refused to discuss the matter with
Roosevelt when it was informally raised in November 1943. At Yalta
in 1945, Roosevelt secretly mentioned to Stalin his ideas for the
future of Hong Kong, as "he hoped that the British would give back
the sovereignty of Hong Kong to China and that it would then
become an internationalised free port."' 5 He sent General Patrick
Hurley to London to discuss the issue. "[O]ver my dead body" was
Churchill's response.16
By 1945, Britain was assuming that the status quo ante bellum
would be restored in Hong Kong. A naval force under Rear-Admiral
Sir Cecil Harcourt arrived in the colony on August 30 to assist in
administration after Japan's collapse on the 14th. The urgent issue
then became the formal acceptance of the Japanese surrender.
Britain initially insisted that her sovereignty over Hong Kong was
the crucial factor, whereas Chiang Kai-shek argued pre-eminence
as commander-in-chief of the China theatre. With Truman and
MacArthur's support, however. Britain offered acceptance of the
surrender by Harcourt on behalf of both Britain and Chiang, and
Chiang agreed. 17 With the British flag once more ascendant,
China's ambition to recover Hong Kong had to rely on post-war
diplomacy.18

14.
James T.H. Tang, World War to Cold War: Hong Kong's Future and
Anglo-Chinese Interactions, 1941-55 in Ming K. Chan (ed), PREcARIoUs BALANCE:
HONG KONG BETWEEN CHINAAND BRITAIN 1842-1992, 109 (Ming K. Chan. Ed., 1994).

15.

He said he knew that Mr Churchill would have strong objections to this

suggestion, affirmed by Mr Churchill in the House of Commons in March 1955
("That was certainly correct and even an under-statement").
Minute on
F0371/115058.
16.

See Note by Churchill, 11 Apr. 1945, in CO 129/592/8: "Itook him up

with violence about Hong Kong and said that never would we yield an inch of the
territory that was under the British flag."
17.
CHAN LAU KIT-CHING, supra note 11, at 319-22. For Chiang's reasons,
see Shian Li, 'he ExtraterritorialityNegotiations of 1943 and the New Territories, 30
MODERN ASIAN STUDIES 617,648 (1996).
18.
See Tang, supra note 14. at 110, on British reasons-prestige, pride,
commercial interests, strategic concerns - for wishing to retain Hong Kong.
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IllI. THE EARLY POST-WAR PERIOD: 1945-1949
The Colonial Office had nevertheless remained flexible on the
future of Hong Kong, at least in regard to the New Territories. A
note to the Far Eastern Economic Sub-committee of the War
Cabinet in December, 1944 had stated the hope "that a favourable
opportunity will be taken to secure at least a prolonged term

arrangement with China which will assure the Colony of the noninterruption of the many public services dependent on the New
Territories-Water supply, airfield, certain port facilities-and will
permit of business confidence in development."' 9 A Cabinet paper,
dated October 9, 1945, referred to several possibilities, including
return of the New Territories, but with an Anglo-Chinese joint board
of management for the airport and the water storage and supply
system, a joint municipal board for the urban parts of the New
Territories contiguous to British Kowloon. and a Chinese
government representative on the port authority.2 0 Early in 1946, a
prominent Hong Kong businessman, John Keswick, suggested a
"self-governing municipality" in place of the colony, and on January
25, Mr. G. V. Kitson in the Foreign Office minuted, "A settlement
which would satisfy Chinese demands and conserve our interests
for a generation at least would be to hand back the whole Colony to
China and then lease it from China for, say, 30 years (on the Port
Arthur precedent) ostensibly as a naval base, with limited Chinese
participation in the local administration."2 1 This, or something
similar, had been considered by the Far Eastern Civil Planning Unit,
which commented that to retrocede Hong Kong outright was not an
option until at least a strong and just government was established
in China, able to deliver fair trading conditions for foreign
22
enterprise.
The Foreign Office was perhaps more sensitive to post-war
realities than the Colonial Office, officials expressing concern at the
decision to send Sir Mark Young back as Governor in 1946. A
British observer had complained that civil affairs staff in Hong Kong
had returned "completely oblivious of what has happened in the Far
East since 1941, with the one idea of getting things back to 'normal'

as soon as possible, and by this they meant in the first place getting
the clubs going again and leaving their offices at 5 p.m. These
people will, of course, be disillusioned before very long, but in the
meantime grave harm may be done to our relation with the Chinese,

19.
20.
21.
F752.
22.

See CO129/592/8.
McVittie to Colonial Office, 10 Oct. 1945, in CO129/592/8.
See a file on the future of the University of Hong Kong. F0371/53639
See C0537/1656.
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both in Hong Kong and in China."2 3 Kitson thought a mayor might
be more appropriate than a traditional colonial governor. Kitson
was much involved with the Hong Kong question, and later in
February, 1946, he produced the first draft of an important
memorandum titled "The Future of Hong Kong." He summarized
the Chinese position (as "essentially a moral issue, and for her a
vital one"), as well as the case for retention (commercial, political,
and strategic), U.S. and Soviet attitudes, and China's tactical
strength. He also made the case for an "adjustment" designed to
meet Chinese aspirations. Rejecting outright cession of the whole
colony as a betrayal of commitments to British business interests in
Hong Kong, he surveyed the following possibilities: (1) retrocession
of the New Territories alone, with safeguards regarding the airport
and water supply: (2) retrocession of the entire territory followed by
a lease-back, with U.N. involvement; and (3) introduction of a
modem system of government along the lines of a "free port and
municipality" with elective institutions. In paragraph 50, he wrote:
It is suggested that His Majesty's Government should issue a
statement referring to our relinquishment of extraterritorial rights
in China in 1943. and recalling that an understanding was reached
on that occasion that His Majesty's Government would be prepared
to discuss the question of the New Territories when victory was
won. The statement could go on to say that. although our lease of
the New Territories does not expire till 1997. His Majesty's
Government is prepared. as a gesture of goodwill and in a spirit of
friendship for the Chinese nation, to enter into negotiations
forthwith with a view to the rendition, on suitable conditions, of the
New Territories to Chinese control. The statement could add that.
as regards Hong Kong itself, the present position is governed by
Treaty arrangements, but in conformity with our feelings of goodwill
and friendship His Majesty's Government is prepared to consider
with the Chinese government any adjustment which may be called
for by the conditions and requirements of the post-war world as
applied to this territory, and which would take into account the
24
benefits accruing from Sino-British co-operation in the Far East.

Meanwhile, the Colonial Office sent along for comment a
proposed statement to be issued by Sir Mark Young on his
resumption of the governorship from the interim military
administration. Although this seemed in line with the third option
of Kitson's draft memorandum, suggesting a fully representative
municipal council to take over some government functions, Kitson
was dismayed that, in failing to refer to China's aspirations, it would
irritate and disappoint the Chinese,2 5 though the text was only

23.
24.
25.
F3865.

See F0371/53631 F2134.
F0371/53632 F3237.
Minute on Lloyd to Stemdale Bennett. 13 Mar. 1946, in F0371/53633
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marginally amended. 2 6 Another idea was revived as well, the
"internationalization" of Hong Kong. Kitson objected that it would
give the Soviet Union a foothold in Hong Kong, and that "the
Chinese would look askance at an internationalized Hong Kong
representing another Shanghai International Settlement and a
perpetuation of the 'unequal treaties.'" 2 7 Sir Mark Young thought
that to return the New Territories while retaining the ceded districts
was not practicable, even if New Kowloon (the urban area
contiguous to ceded Kowloon) and the Walled City of Kowloon were
by agreement with China retained.
Sir Horace Seymour,
Ambassador in Nanking, doubted whether China would be "willing
to deal with the New Territories apart from the Colony... In any
event the usual Chinese technique would be to take what they
could get as a first installment towards the attainment of their full
28
object."
Kitson produced a revised version of his memorandum in July,
1946. This time he suggested that return of the New Territories
alone was no longer feasible: "Any attempt on our part to draw a
distinction between Hong Kong and the New Territories would
simply be treated as legal casuistry. The two have become
inseparable in the Chinese mind, and no solution can be
satisfactory unless it treats the problem as a whole." 29 A new
alternative solution, equally not supported, was some form of AngloChinese condominium over Hong Kong. He referred also to
international control, his earlier objections being reiterated.
Paragraph 50 of the first draft disappeared, and his principal
recommendation was:
(a)
that we should consider the restoration of Chinese
sovereignty over Hong Kong and the termination of the existing
lease of the New Territories:
(b)
that with the surrender of sovereignty we should wish to
secure our rights and interests in Hong Kong for, say, thirty years
and to negotiate with the Chinese a position by which Hong Kong
could function as a secure commercial base for not only British but
also international interests: land]
(c)
that we should take the initiative by approaching the
Chinese Government with a view to discussions on the basis of the
proposal outlined in paragraph 43 above [which referred to a
stipulation that Hong Kong. "in addition to being a free port, would
be available for the joint use of Britain and China as a naval and

26.
Secretary of State to Harcourt, secret, 5 Apr. 1946, in F0371/53634
F5707.
27.
F0371/53635 F10373.
28.
Memorandum, "Consideration of Development Policy in the New
Territories" (53687/48), 7 Oct. 1948, in C0537/3712 (34056).
29.
F0371/5365 F10572.
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air base for maintaining security in the Pacific in accordance with
their respective, obligations under the United Nations Charter"J. 3 0

No further action, however, was taken on this recommendation, and
it seems simply to fade away in the available government records.
Just prior to Kitson's revised draft, and recorded in annexes no
longer on file, Chiang Kai-shek and Wellington Koo "enquired
informally whether conversations could be opened between our two
Governments with a view to reaching a solution of the Hong Kong
problem.-31 The relevant original file in the Public Record Office at
Kew is marked "retained in department," and this approach is not
referred to in other open documents. Presumably Chiang and Koo
were "informally" informed that the time was not yet ripe for
conversation on that topic.
A joint CO-FO memorandum on the future of Hong Kong was
prepared in November, 1946, proposing conditions for any
premature surrender of the New Territories lease. These included
joint management of the water supply system and an
understanding regarding new government installations in the
territory, and they were reiterated in a Colonial Office document in
April 1947.32 The Colonial Office had meanwhile wanted a paper
which included the case against a British initiative. 3 3 G. W. Swire
strongly urged retention of Hong Kong in order to preserve Britain's
China trade, 34 and the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Hong

Kong complained that "in a hundred years, we have done almost
nothing by education, social services or political education to foster
a 'Hong Kong' patriotism among the Chinese."35 Other, more urgent
matters claimed attention. 3 6 Late in 1947, the KMT government,
without expressly seeking discussions on the retrocession of the
New Territories, issued instructions that elections for the National
Assembly be held in the Walled City of Kowloon.
Seymour's
successor in Nanking, Sir Ralph Stevenson, reported the Chinese
view that China as reversionary landlord had extensive powers of

30.
Id.
31.
Kitson to Vile. 26 Aug. 1946. in FO371/53636 F1 1428.
32.
See supra note 28.
33.
Lloyd to Dening. secret, 22 Aug. 1946, in F0371/53637 F12400.
34.
Swire to Kitson, 13 Aug. 1946, inFO371/53637 F12400.
35.
Sloss to Cripps, 11 Oct. 1946, inFO371/53638 F15424.
36.
See, however, a long letter received by the Royal Institute of
International Affairs, dated 16 Apr. 1947, quoting T.V. Soong's description of Hong
Kong as "the thom in the side of China" and urging the need to avoid causing
economic problems to China, in F0371/63388 F6544. Further, N.L. Smith,
former Colonial Secretary in Hong Kong. volunteered a memorandum in August
1948 proposing the return of the New Territories on condition that New Kowloon
be ceded to Britain and that arrangements be made to protect the reservoirs ("A
very large annual cash subvention might go some of the way to Its solution") and
the airfield, in C0537/3702 and CO 129/609/8.
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intervention in New Territories affairs. The same attitude appeared
in relation to the Hong Kong government's attempt to evict squatters
from the Walled City. which became a major controversy early in
1948. 3 7 Scott in the FO had little doubt "that the Chinese
Government would have been only too glad to let sleeping dogs lie
but they did not want the dog to go permanently to sleep." 38
Stevenson, however, cabled in late January 1948 that Kuomintang
policy was "to keep agitation for return of Hong Kong alive and
foster the genuine feeling on the subject which undoubtedly exists
in this country." 3 9 Nevertheless, Britain would not shortly be faced
with a formal approach for retrocession. As Stevenson stated, "My
impression is that they do not yet regard the time as ripe for such a
move." 40 Yet five months later he wrote that the Vice-Minister for
Foreign Affairs had denied any intention on the part of the Chinese
41
government to raise the question of the status of Hong Kong.
In 1948 and 1949, the Colonial Office was concerned with
proposals for developments in the New Territories, such as a

reservoir at Tai Lam Chung and an airport at Deep Bay. Mr. J. B.
Sidebotham minuted in October. 1948 that the government must
assume a British decision not to hand back the New Territories
until 1997; in any event, since there could be no legal basis for
claiming compensation from China for investments in the leasehold,
planning should proceed on the basis that capital costs would be
fully amortized by that date. Continued development was desirable
"as an indication to the Chinese that we intend to remain there until
the end of the lease." 4 2 Action was deferred pending discussion in
Cabinet, when it was decided that HMG should stay in Hong Kong
"in the absence of conditions in which the Colony's future4 3 can be
discussed with a friendly and stable Chinese Government."
As the civil war in China neared its conclusion, of course, the
other primary issue was to tailor policy to the expected new
situation of a communist government assuming office. Hong Kong
was particularly concerned about influxes of refugees, 4 4 and
Grantham was anxious for a public assurance of the British
position in the colony. The Under Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs had stated in the House of Commons on December 10, 1948

37.
Stevenson to FO, secret, No. 6, 3 Jan. 1948, in F0371/69578 F1352.
See WEsLEY-SMIH, supranote 3, at 127.

38.

Id.

39.
Stevenson to FO, important, tel. No. 99, 28 Jan. 1948, in
F0371/69578 F1471.
40.
Id.
Stevenson to FO, important, confidential, tel. No. 523, 23 June 1948,
41.
in F0371/69574.

42.

See minutes inC0537/3712 and F0371/115058.

43.
44.

Id.
See Grantham to CO, secret, tel. No. 1187, 24 Dec. 1948, in C078/ 1.
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that "it is the intention of HMG to maintain their position in Hong
Kong... Indeed, we feel that in this particularly troubled situation
the value and importance of Hong Kong as a centre of stability will
be greater than ever. "4 5 But Grantham wanted further and
unambiguous promises that that policy would not change. 4 6
Opinion was divided, and the matter was shelved for the time being,
though Grantham, worried about recent developments in the
Chinese civil war and their effect on morale in Hong Kong,
unsuccessfully renewed his request in May 1949.4 7

Indeed,

Cabinet ministers were by then of the view that "it would be neither
militarily nor politically possible for us to remain in Hong Kong if
there were a settled Government of China which was one hundred
per cent hostile to our staying there," and that it would be best to lie
low until it was known what the communists wanted.48 The former
director of the Shanghai office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
stated his belief the following month that the new leaders of China
would be prepared to leave the question of Hong Kong in suspense,
provided it was not thrust under their noses. Mr. F. S. Tomlinson
minuted, "We have to devise means of giving our friends the
maximum encouragement, while at the same time giving our
enemies the minimum provocation." 4 9
In June 1949, the Cabinet asked for a new memorandum
regarding long-term policy on Hong Kong. Mr. J. J. Paskin
extracted from a minute by the Foreign Secretary's private secretary
the following statement:
The study would have to be based on the assumption that,
despite recent changes in the internal situation in China, it will not
be possible for us to retreat from the position taken up with
Marshal Chiang Kai-Shek during the war. Le.. that the future of
Hong Kong would be a question discussable with the Government
of China when the war was over. This basic assumption is
necessitated both by our announced policy of desire to reach
amicable relations with whatever government emerges in China and
by the probable reactions of the United States, India and Australia
to any other line on our part. If the new government of China
raises this issue, we must be ready to tackle it on this basis.
The limited duration of the lease of the New Territories also
makes this study necessary. The possibility of the loss of the New
Territories on the prescribed date and the consequent effect on the

45.
Secretary of State to Grantham, important, tel. No. 2, 1 Jan. 1949, in
F0371/75839; see also the statement by Rees-williams on 7 July 1948 that no
change was contemplated in the status of Hong Kong as a Crown colony.
46.
Grantham to CO, secret, tel. No. 79, 26 Jan. 1949, in F0371/75839.
47.
Grantham to Creech Jones, top secret, No. 16, 3 May 1949, in
F0371/75780.
48.
Shanghai office to FO, top secret, priority, No. 411, 3 June 1949, in
F0371/75874.

49.

Brook, Cabinet Office, to Dening, Foreign Office, secret and personal,

12 May 1949, inFO371/75872.
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situation of Hong Kong in itself calls for an evaluation of the future
of the Colony and its status and defensibility in the changed
circumstances.
There is however the important corollary that. so long as any
menace to Hong Kong remains and there is any possibility of the
use of force or measure of duress against it, no public intimation
that His Majesty's Government would be prepared to discuss the
future of the Colony can be given, in view of the disastrous effect
50
which such intimation would have on local morale.

At a Cabinet meeting in August, a member had asked whether
consideration had been given to an international regime for Hong
Kong. Foreign Office clerks reviewed previous discussions in 1946,
in Kitson's memoranda, and by the July working party, and Mr. P.
D. Coates produced a paper on "International Control of Hong
Kong" on September 5 that effectively ruled out further
contemplation of the idea. 5 1 The reasons given were that: (1) the
United States (whose anti-colonialist attitudes had prompted the
original discussions) opposed the idea unless both the USSR and
communist China were kept out, and the U.N. would not endorse
their exclusion: (2) few friendly powers would be willing to
participate; (3) Chinese nationalist susceptibilities would be
offended "as it would appear to defer sine die the return of Hong
Kong to China," and the Chinese government would probably be
provoked into immediate counter-action; and (4) the practical
difficulties, in the face of Chinese hostility, would be overwhelming.
There were equally conclusive arguments against trusteeship: the
U.N. would wish to set up a commission to ascertain the wishes of
the inhabitants of Hong Kong by plebiscite, and "even if a plebiscite
were to record a majority for remaining under British sovereignty
and Hong Kong were placed under United Kingdom trusteeship, the
goal to which the Trusteeship Council would work would have to be
the attainment of self-government or independence. Soviet and
Chinese influence in the Council, together with the lukewarm
attitude of other Powers, would5 2ensure that the administration of
Hong Kong became impossible."
Already in May it had been decided by Cabinet that further
reinforcements proposed by the Ministry of Defence should be sent

50.
Paskin to Scarlett, secret, 24 June 1949, in F0371/75839.
51.
F0371/75839.
52.
Id.: see also Dening's minute to the Foreign Secretary, 18 Aug. 1949, in
F0371/75878 (rejecting an international solution for two reasons: It would be "a
solution least likely to commend itself to the Chinese," and the likelihood of a
Soviet veto in the UN). The Foreign Secretary's decision that a system of
international control would not solve "the Hong Kong problem" was communicated
to the Colonial Office in Paskin to Dening, secret, 31 Aug. 1949, in CO537/4805.
Several years later, however, though with no effect on British policy, trusteeship
was proposed by Sir John Slessor, Marshall of the Royal Air Force: The Times, 5
Sept. 1958, in CO1030/595.
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to Hong Kong and that the United States should be asked -to
support a policy of defending Hong Kong against aggression by
Communist forces from the mainland and, if need be to make at the
appropriate stage a public declaration in support of that policy."5 3
Additionally, "[w]e are advised that the Communists might be in a
position to stage an attack upon Hong Kong by the beginning of
September at the earliest. While it is by no means certain that they
will resort to such a course, we have decided that to be ready to
meet such a threat will be the best way of averting it."5 4 Mr. Dening
had written to the Foreign Secretary that, "Mr Malcolm MacDonald
tells me that he thinks we should make up our minds that we will
stay in Hong Kong come what may and proceed from that decision
to work out how we can get the maximum support for such a
5
policy."

5

By September, British policy pending establishment of "a
friendly and stable Government of a unified China"5 6 (thought
unlikely to exist in the foreseeable future) was set out in
communications to Commonwealth governments. No long-term
policy could be attempted, but until conditions had changed Britain
would remain in Hong Kong. This was based, over and above
Britain's "unassailable legal right," on the (presumed) interests and
wishes of inhabitants, Hong Kong's value for international trade, its
strategic value, and express or implied undertakings by the U.K.
government that no alteration of the status quo was contemplated.
Steps would be taken to deal with the threat or actual use of force
by the Chinese communists or the use of pressure through
fomenting internal unrest. Peaceful negotiations were not a live
issue with the Nationalist government, and "[wie should be
unwilling to discuss Hong Kong with a China which was not united
because its future would be likely to become a pawn in the contest
between conflicting factions."5 7 It did not seem likely that any
Chinese government would be prepared to renew the lease in 1997.
53.
FO to Council of Foreign Ministers, Paris (U.K. delegation), top secret,
immediate, tel. No. 200, 28 May 1949, in F0371/75872; tel. No. 201 of the same
date regarding general considerations to put to the U.S.
54.
FO to Council of Foreign Ministers, Paris (U.K. delegation), top secret,
immediate, tel. No. 201, 28 May 1949, inFO371/75873.
55.
Dated 19 May 1949, in F0371/75872.
56.
See Tang, supra note 14, at 125-26 (referring to a file closed in the
Public Record Office but available in the Arthur Creech-Jones Papers: Cabinet
agreed in August that Britain should discuss the future of Hong Kong only with a
Chinese government that was friendly, democratic-though that requirement was
later deleted - stable, and in control of a unified China.)
57.
Enclosures in Maclennan, Commonwealth Relations Office, to Paskin,
top secret, immediate, 31 Aug. 1949, in F0371/75839. The statement was in
draft form but the Colonial Office agreed, and the actual text appears in
Commonwealth Relations Office to High Commissioners, top secret, tel. Nos. 325
and 326, 7 Sept. 1949, in C0537/4805.
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"Without these territories Hong Kong would be untenable and it is
therefore probable that before 1997 the U.K. Government of the day
will have to consider the status of Hong Kong."58 But that question
59
could not be considered "some two generations in advance."
Perhaps the last official position taken by the Nationalist
government on Hong Kong was a statement to the U.N. Special
Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories in
August, 1949. This is of particular interest because it anticipated
by some fifteen years the crucial objection to the jurisdiction of the
"Committee of Twenty-Four" lodged by the representative of the
People's Republic of China (PRC). The objection was crucial because
it effectively destroyed any opportunity within the international
community of asserting the right of Hong Kong people to selfdetermination.
Mr. Li (China) asserted that, if the fact that
sovereignty over a territory rested with a state other than the
administering power was a reason for ceasing to transmit
information to the Special Committee (as the United States had
argued in relation to the Panama Canal Zone), then information

should cease to be transmitted on Kowloon and the New Territories.
While not a request that the exercise of sovereignty be restored to
China, Li's statement caused some concern in the Colonial Office,
which hastily reviewed its position on the issue of sovereignty over
60
the leasehold.
The British were in theory prepared to discuss the future of
Hong Kong with the Kuomintang government, and if a formal
request had been made, it could not have resisted. Nevertheless,
they remained mindful of Hong Kong's value as a British possession
and reluctant to let the colony go. As the civil war in China
intensified, the Nationalists became increasingly unable to
contemplate the huge task of absorbing Hong Kong.
The
establishment of the People's Republic on October 1, 1949, which it
was feared would soon lead to invasion or peremptory demands for
retrocession, in fact secured the status quo for the next nearly fifty
years.

58.
Id.
59.
Id.
60.
See Fletcher-Cooke to CO, confidential, priority, tel. No. 170, 26 Aug.
1949, Creech Jones to Grantham, secret, No. 53, 19 Nov. 1949, and other
correspondence and minutes in C0537/4800; see also F0371/75931 F135472.

436

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OFTRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 30:421

IV. THE EARLY COMMUNIST PERIOD: 1950-1964
[When that part that is leased goes back to China, In my opinion.
the rest of the colony could not continue as a viable entity, and
therefore will be surrendered by Britain. Which all leads to my
theory, and it is nothing more than a theory, that In thirty-nine
years' time, China will get Hong Kong back on a plate with all the
buildings and everything. And therefore, they're not dumb: why on
earth should they disturb this state of affairs by trying to attack
Hong Kong now; they've got to wait less than forty years and they
get the whole thing back on a plate.
-

SirAlexander Grantharn. 195861

Although there was a concentration of Chinese troops near the
Hong Kong border, the communist government did not attempt to
take over the colony by force. There were to be some anxious
moments over the next three years. In retrospect, however, it seems
that China had more urgent priorities,6 2 and although British
preconditions of a stable government of a unified China had soon
been met-and of a friendly government as well, at least in the
sense that Britain had accorded diplomatic recognition to the new

Chinese regime in February, 1950-no formal demand for the
return of Hong Kong was made until 1982. In the meantime, the
colony was urgently adjusting to new influxes of refugees, the

sudden collapse of its entrep6t economy (with the Korean Warrelated U.S. embargo on China trade in December 1950 and the
U.N. embargo on dealing with China in strategic goods imposed six
months later),63 and the need to industrialize. The most sensitive
political problem was not democratization--constitutional reform,
promoted by Sir Mark Young, was a dead issue6 4-but mainland
rivalries being played out in Hong Kong. For as long as the local

61.
Transcript of a radio Interview with the recently retired Governor of
Hong Kong, 9 Sept. 1958, in CO1030/595.
62.
Reuters man in Hong Kong had been told by the head of the New
China News Agency that there was no intention of forcibly recovering the colony.
Nevertheless Britain was not prepared to relax vigilance against a possible move
by the communists. See STEVE YUI-SANG TSANG, DEMOCRACY SHELVED: GREAT
BRITAIN, CHINA, AND ATTEMvS AT CONSTITITIONAL REFORM INHONG KONG, 1945-1952

86-87 (1988). Soon after the establishment of the PRC, NCNA staff were told that
"the eventual recovery of Hong Kong remains a long-term mission, but you need
not worry about It now." Tang, supranote 14, at 117.
63.
On the economic depression In Hong Kong In 1951-52: see Tsang,
supra note 62, at 169-72. Hong Kong was described by an American Journalist In
1951 as "'this dying city,' with its trade cut off by the flat of outside nations
engaged in a struggle against communism." G B ENDACOTr, A HISTORY OF HONG
KONG 316 (2nd ed. 1973).
64.
It was officially discarded In October 1952. See generally Tsang, supra
note 62; N.J. Miners, Plansfor ConstitutionalReform in Hong Kong, 1946-52, 107
China Quarterly 463 (1986).
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government could enforce neutrality on this question, or more
particularly prevent the colony from being used as a base to subvert
the PRC, it could avoid provoking serious mainland interference
with its affairs or, worse, demands for rendition.
The Acting Governor noted in July, 1950 that recent eventsan embargo on the shipment of oil products, controls on exports of
strategic materials, and resentment over the detention of aircraft at
Kai Tak airport-had significantly decreased Hong Kong's value to
China. He feared that "a more creative policy of pressure in Hong
Kong" would soon be pursued by the Chinese government, although
"China cannot yet afford to cut itself off from Hong Kong, which

remains its only open door to the South Seas and to the rest of the

world."65 Further, the Peking government had during the previous
six months deliberately soft-pedaled in its attitude to Hong Kong,
with personnel apparently under strict instructions "to behave
correctly and to create no trouble." Moreover. "[wihile it is quite
clear and axiomatic that the ultimate aim of the Central People's
Government of China is to recover Hong Kong, there is as yet no
direct evidence to suggest that this aim is in the immediate forefront
of their programme." 6 6 Communist influence in labour circles had
lost ground, but in education it presented a growing threat.6 7 There
remained nervousness about China's military intentions: a defence
policy for Hong Kong, with special regard to attack by China, was
approved in October, 68 and consideration was given to the
evacuation of Hong Kong in an emergency. 6 9 The Secretary of State
for the Colonies publicly stated on May 2, 1951, that, "despite the
unsettled conditions in the Far East, I am glad to note that Hong
Kong sets an example of courage and commonsense in a difficult
period, and I wish to repeat the assurances that have been made
before that His Majesty's Government have every intention of
discharging their responsibilities in Hong Kong both as regards
defence and the welfare of the population."70 In the summer,
Unofficial Members of the Legislative Council pressed HMG for a
further statement of intentions towards Hong Kong,7 1 and the
Secretary of State obliged in December during a visit to the

65.
Officer Administering the Government to CO, secret, priority. tel No
840, 24 July 1950, in F0371/83397.
66,
Officer Administering the Government to James Griffiths MP, secret, 21
July 1950, inFO371/83263.
67.
Id.
68.
Ministry of Defence to GHQ Far East Land Forces, top secret, tel
'Cossea' 774, 4 Oct. 1950, in F0371/83398.
69.
GHQ Far East Land Forces to HQ Land Forces, Hong Kong, top secret,
tel. 'SEC' 5/2, 14 Oct. 1950, inFO371/83398.
70.
Hong Kong. Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies,
19 Nov. 1951, secret, Cabinet paper C(51)25, in CAB129/48.
71.
Id.
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Colony.72 Early in 1952, the Governor, Sir Alexander Grantham,
sent a secret memorandum to the Colonial Office in which he
reported that "the internal situation in the Colony is delicate and
potentially
explosive"
with
concerns
of
unemployment,
overcrowding, divided political loyalties amongst the Chinese
population and left-wing propaganda. and concern lest China cut
supplies of food. Apart from direct military attack. "there exist
within the Colony itself ample opportunities for stirring up very
serious trouble should the Chinese authorities decide on such a
move in retaliation for what they regarded as evidence of hostility In
the Hong Kong Government's handling of the internal situation." 73
Grantham stated that firm action was being taken against any
political activity, of whatever persuasion, likely to prejudice security:
74
avoidance of both provocation and appeasement was necessary.
In fact, the communists began a propaganda campaign in January,
complaining about strong colonial government action against
sympathisers, but "what really distinguished it" was its relative
75
restraint, and by June it was over.
The colonial government's policy was evidently successful, and
dispatches and other documents on the future of Hong Kong are
scarcely to be found among the British records from 1952 to 1956.
Steve Tsang writes that, in the latter half of 1952, communist
officials "resumed their old policy of conciliation towards the colonial
government. They had not changed their fundamental attitude and
policy towards the colony, and there was no indication that they
intended to approach the British with regard to its political status.
Their threat to Hong Kong's security remained more potential than
76
immediate."
The Political Adviser in Hong Kong, a Foreign Office appointee,
provided in June 1956 a useful review of policies up to that time.
Communist tactics had first been aggressive, including incitement
to violence, but these had failed. "The violence was suppressed,
ringleaders were deported and, generally speaking, such aggressive
tactics were ill received by the general public."7 7 After political
campaigns on the mainland had caused "a revulsion of feeling" in
Hong Kong against the communists, a new tactic of "peaceful
penetration" was adopted through more positive efforts in labour
and education. Then, in 1955, Chinese policy moved "from passive

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Minute in F0371/115058.
Enclosure in Paskin to Scott, secret, 9 Jan. 1952, in F0371/99243.

Id.
See Tsang, supranote 62, at 175-79.
Id. at 174.
Dalton to O'Neill, secret, 22 June 1956, inFO371/120910.
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non-violence to active gestures of friendship,"78 which included
invitations to visit the republic, large business contracts for selected
merchants, and negotiations for resumption of the through train
service to Canton. This had to be treated with caution and
suspicion by the Hong Kong government, though it was suggested
that, "by and large, our policy is approved by the great majority of
the population."79 That policy continued to the end of the 1950s
and beyond, exercised through the censorship of films and school
books, powers in the Education Ordinance to deal with left-wing
schools, 80 interference with the right of schools to fly the Chinese
flag, and so on, all matters which the Chinese government and local
left-wing newspapers criticized.
But it was even-handed in
execution, being directed at both leftist and rightist activities
(Malcolm MacDonald met Zhou Enlai in 1962 who "spoke
appreciatively of Hong Kong Government's efforts to stop
representatives of 'the Chiang Kai-shek clique' from using Hong
Kong for improper, violent purposes against China.")8 Over the
last ten years, the Governor reported in 1959. Chinese policy had
aimed at the long-term preparation of the Chinese population for
peaceful absorption into China. 8 2 A year later the Chinese
government was still reacting moderately to such provocations as
the deportation of communist front personnel and the prosecution
83
of narcotics dealers in the Walled City.

Negotiations on the through train-over the Sham Chun River
at Lo Wu, not the modem sense of Hong Kong's institutions
surviving the takeover on July 1, 1997-had broken down, but in
January 1958, Mr. Zhou Enlai, China's Foreign Minister, asked
through an intermediary that they be resumed. He also wanted a
properly accredited Chinese representative in the colony and the

78.
Id. According to Dick Wilson (though I found no reference to it in the
government records), Sir Alexander Grantham went to Beijing in 1955, spoke to
Zhou Enlai, and returned with the unofficial message that China accepted the
British presence and would not undermine it, that Hong Kong was a problem left
over by history which could be resolved at leisure, and that China accepted the
status quo-as long as Britain kept order, and did not allow Hong Kong to become
either self-governing (because that would

rule out rejoining China) or a

Guomindang base. To these "conditions" was later added an injunction against
allowing the Russians to build up a presence there. This was the basic BritishChinese understanding about Hong Kong which was to last into the 1990s, in
HONG KONG! HONG KONG! 196 (1990).

79.
See supranote 77.
80.
See, e.g., the decision by the Executive Council that Mr Parker To's
registration as manager of a left-wing school and his permit to teach be cancelled
and that he be deported. CO131/161.
81.
See extract from MacDonald to FO, tel. No. 12, 14 Nov. 1962, in
C01030/114.
82.
Enclosure in Black to CO. secret, No 130, 21 Jan. 1959, in
C01030/596.
83.
Black to CO, No 246, 1 Feb. 1960, in CO 1030/1338.
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suppression of KMT agents. 8 4 The day before, Lieutenant Colonel
Kenneth Cantlie had been summoned to an interview with Zhou
whose main object, Cantlie reported, was to warn the United
Kingdom against an alleged conspiracy by right-wing Chinese,
assisted by Americans, to turn Hong Kong into a self-governing
Dominion within the Commonwealth.
Chou En-lai said that any such development would be most
unwelcome to the Chinese, who did not want to see Hong Kong
made into "another Singapore." A self-governing Hong Kong would.
in their opinion, open its doors to Chiang Kai-shek and the
Americans.
"The workers of Hong Kong and the Chinese
Government wished to see it continue in peace as a British
"
colony. 85

This is a highly significant statement, for it not only shows
Chinese goodwill towards Hong Kong, but it demonstrates that the
failure of the colonial authorities to provide a democratic political
system was directly attributable, at least since 1958 if not before,8 6
to Chinese intervention. Norman Miners writes that "unofficially
[British] ministers and officials have claimed that the People's
Republic of China objects to free elections and Britain has found it
expedient to give heed to China's views." 8 7 He adds, "This has never
been publicly and unambiguously admitted by any Minister of the
Crown while in office to avoid diplomatic embarrassment." 8 8
Further, "Communist China could live with a colony ruled by
British administrators but would not long have tolerated one which

84.
Acting High Commissioner in India to Commonwealth Relations Office,
secret, priority, No. 179, 31 Jan. 1958. in C01030/595.
85.
Peking Embassy to FO. secret, No. 59. 1 Feb. 1958, in C01030/595:
see also the annex to a secret draft note, dated 21 September 1962, containing an
extract from the Zhou-Cantlle interview. Zhou had stated: "China wished the
present Colonial status of Hong Kong to continue with no change whatever ....
The enormous American Consulate-General in Hong Kong was merely a base for
subversive activities in China and this would become worse If Hong Kong were

self-governing. China wanted peace with Hong Kong." See C012030/1334.
86.
See supranote 78.
87.
See supranote 64. at 463.
88.
Id., see also minute by Lord Perth, having spoken to the British charge
d'affaires in Peking, to the effect that China wanted no constitutional change In
Hong Kong, preferring the direct government they know. C01030/114: see also
Sir David Trench's concern about the proposal to extend municipal government In
New Territories towns: "It is possible that they [the Chinese] might see In this the
beginning of an unwelcome desire on our part to move the Colony towards selfgovernment or independence, and object strongly." Trench to Wallace. secret, 26
May 1965, in F0371/181000. A different view was taken by the Colonial Office In
1964: "Hong Kong's constitutional development cannot be along normal lines
leading to self government and independence since that would mean laying it
open to Communist penetration and control." Poynton to Black, secret, 13 Jan.
1964, in F0371/175888.
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9
offered opportunities for its political opponents to attain power."8
Despite this almost self-evident point, Britain recently has been
frequently reviled for its failure to introduce democracy into Hong
Kong, and pro-China polemicists have boasted that the selection of
the Chief Executive-designate in 1996 was by a process more
democratic than any by which a colonial Governor was chosen.
In 1961, several British Ministers questioned the value of Hong
Kong to Britain and doubted the need to keep the colony. The
Colonial Office referred to a minute by Mr. P. Selwyn that concluded
that "it costs us very little to stay in Hong Kong, but would cost us a

great deal to get out."90 A letter from the Govemor in October
196291 discussed the case of Hong Kong, in the event that the U.N.
took an interest in its future, in the course of which he made several
(1) Any movement towards selfmost interesting points:
determination and self-government had been specifically and
secretly excluded by the British government on political grounds: (2)
The United Kingdom clearly held Hong Kong at China's sufferance:
(3) Communist China had denounced the "unequal treaties"
generally but never expressly called the Hong Kong treaties into
question, most probably out of national self-interest; (4) "In recent
months there has been evidence, which I can only describe as
spectacular, of China's new willingness to co-operate with us in
matters of local and immediate concern," (5) Any hint that Britain
was considering the future could lead to "that constructive loss of
confidence which we have always regarded as Hong Kongs death
knell;" (6) "It is vital for Hong Kong's stability that there should be
no official or authorised pronouncement on Hong Kong's future
until and unless this becomes clearly unavoidable:" and (7) China's
silence on Hong Kong had enabled the U.K. to keep the colony free
Specifically, the
from general pressures to liberate colonies.
Governor stated:
There Is a good deal of pragmatic truth in the paradox that
Britain's and China's sense of history flows forward confidently into
the future: she has an undaunted sense of time. There are no
explanations for her failure to press her claims on Hong Kong
hitherto, other than a conviction that time will not derogate from
those claims and an assessment that her immediate interests
counsel restraint. It is on this slim thread that the stability and,
indeed, the security of Hong Kong depend. We speak here of "the
timetable." I have little doubt that a "timetable" for Hong Kong
exists in China's future policy. I have little doubt, too, that the

"timetable" is capable of significant modification. 9 2

See supranote 64, at 482.
89.
See CO1030/1300.
90.
Black to Poynton, top secret and personal,
91.
CO1030/1300.
Id.
92.

30 Oct.

1962, in
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The Governor concluded:
If it is accepted that eventual Incorporation with China Is the
only feasible long-term future for Hong Kong, and if it is also
accepted that it is within the power of the Chinese alone to vary
their "timetable" for Hong Kong. would it not be prudent for us to
be thinking now of the terms we would wish to see if the Chinese
advanced their programme, if they gave scope for some degree of
negotiation, and ifinternational relations made It impossible for
Britain to resist or obstruct the Chinese Intentions? 9 3

There was a proposal to hold an adjournment debate on Hong

Kong in the House of Commons in 1963 which the Colonial Office
tried to persuade its mover to drop (the last previous reference in
the House to the future of Hong Kong was in February 1959, when
an MP asked the Foreign Secretary whether he would take the
initiative in discussing the matter with the Chinese government now
rather waiting until the expiration of the lease; the reply was "No.
sir.")9 4 A memorandum by C. M. MacLehose, then a clerk in the
Foreign Office but later Governor of Hong Kong who, ironically,
raised the question of Hong Kong with Deng Xiaoping in 1979,

summed up the dangers of parliamentary debate on Hong Kong. He
referred to a recent editorial in the People's Daily stating that Hong

Kong would be dealt with when the time was ripe, but that
meanwhile the stahis quo should be maintained. 95
This was about as good as one could hope for. and suggests that
the Chinese are prepared to accept the existence of the Colony for
the time being and for what they can get out of It. If left alone this
state of affairs might run on for a considerable time, but if we were
ever to raise with them the principle of the future of the Colony
their only possible reply, whether otherwise convenient to them or
not, would be to demand its rendition. If the public In Hong Kong
believed that the future of the Colony was under discussion an
immediate collapse in confidence would ensue . ..

[The Chinese

might think the debate] an Invitation to discuss the future of Hong
96
Kong, which is precisely what we want to avoid.

However, the risk of discussing the Hong Kong question in
Parliament was raised by the proposal to make a statement about
the future of the remaining colonies. The statement was to apply to
all small colonies except Hong Kong, which was in a unique
position. What comments did the Governor and others have on this

93.
Id.
94.
CO to Black, restricted, immediate, tel No 116, 4 Feb. 1959, in
C01030/596.
95.
The People's Daily article was assumed by the Foreign Office to have
resulted from Kruschev needling the Chinese about Hong Kong and Macao on 12
December 1962.
See MacLehose to Higham. secret, 6 May 1964, In
F0371/175888.
96.
Debate on Hong Kong, confidential, 9 Apr. 1963, in F0371/170635.
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dilemma? Sir Robert Black was most concerned that the Secretary
of State might be drawn to refer to the lease of the New Territories:
"it would carry the implication of an official pronouncement that
there was no future for Hong Kong beyond this date [19971: and I
have no doubt at all that this would have very serious consequences
on confidence here."9 7 Mr. T. W. Garvey in Peking was more
sanguine, not expecting the Chinese to be looking for trouble,
provided no impression were given that any early change in the
colony's relationship with the U.K. was contemplated or that return
to China on the termination of the New Territories lease was

excluded.

98

The issue of how best to refer to Hong Kong in public, when
reference was unavoidable, also arose in relation to the proceedings
of the U.N. Special Committee on Colonialism (the Committee of
Twenty-Four). The Special Committee had been charged with
making recommendations on all remaining non-self-governing
territories, including Hong Kong, in 1964. Higham in the Colonial
Office admitted that the U.K. delegation would have to do "some
delicate tiptoeing." He said, "If the Delegation is asked to state
HMG's attitude to the treaties and the lease it can, we think, quite
properly refuse to be drawn on the ground that these are matters
outside the competence of the Committee." 9 9 The PRC was not then
a member of the United Nations.
The Formosan (Taiwan)
government was not represented on the Committee, but if it were
given permission to intervene as an interested party. the U.K. would
simply refuse to discuss matters they might raise as inappropriate
for consideration in that forum. Higham noted Formosa's statement
in the General Assembly on December 2. 1963 that "any question
about the status of Hong Kong and Macao should be discussed
between the states concerned and that these territories do not seem
to belong in the same category as other non-self-governing
territories to be examined by the Committee."' 0 0 This was precisely
the view put forward, and accepted by the British and the Special
Committee, by the PRC's Ambassador to the U.N. in 1972,101 and it
meant the end of any hopes that the people of Hong Kong might be
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Black to Poynton. secret, 29 Jan. 1964, in F0371/175888.
Garvey to FO, secret, tel No 169, 12 Feb. 1964, in F0371/175888.
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See I. JEROME COHEN & HUNGDAH CHIU, PEOPLE'S CHINA AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY 384 (1974). Garvey had predicted this
when he wrote. "I should, in fact, expect the Chinese to see off any critics in the
Assembly or Security Council and to tell, eg, the Committee of Twenty-Four, to
mind their own business if they showed any inclination to probe into Hong Kong's
affairs."
Garvey to MacLehose, secret and guard, 10 Mar. 1964, in
F0371/175931.
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afforded the right of self-determination when the question of their
02
future later arose. 1
In Sir Robert Black's final review of political and economic
developments in March. 1964. he recognized that the calmer
relations between Hong Kong and China since 1959 were the result
of a deliberate change of policy on the Chinese side. This he
ascribed to the Sino-Soviet dispute, failure of the Great Leap
Forward, and the emergence of the border dispute with India.
China, perhaps anxious not to alienate other countries, had greatly

reduced its pressure on Hong Kong and indeed cooperated
03
positively to provide water during acute shortages in the colony. 1
Problems had remained, including the extraordinary "invasion" of
the colony by tens of thousands of people from Guangdong in 1962,
China's reassertion of sovereignty over the Walled City of Kowloon in
1963, and sabotage activities against China by Kuomintang
supporters in Hong Kong, though the Chinese authorities "ha[d] so
far not pressed [them] particularly hard." However, he continued,
"[W]e must not delude ourselves that the Chinese regard the present
relative calm as more than a tactical pause or that their long-term
objectives have in any way changed." t0 4 Both national pride and
party dogma dictated the eventual recovery of Hong Kong.
Meanwhile China would seek to extend its influence into every
aspect of Hong Kong life, and the Chinese population of Hong Kong,
as China's power and international standing grew. would become
increasingly aware "of the importance of not burning their boats
05
irretrievably."'
The last major file on Hong Kong's future available in 1996
concerns the effect on the colony of the PRC achieving a seat in the
United Nations. The conclusion reached, after discussion between
Garvey. MacLehose, and Edward Youde (also later Governor of Hong
Kong), was that, if and when this development occurred. it would
"probably not tip the balance in favour of a demand for rendition,
though we think that it will be a new and unfavourable factor for
10 6
the Colony."
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V. THE LATER COMMUNIST PERIOD: 1965-1997

There appears to have been no Chinese demand for rendition of
Hong Kong until the British virtually invited it in the 1980s. 10 7 Riots
in 1966 and grave disorder arising from the export of China's
cultural revolution in 1967 did not provoke China to seek return of
the colony.10 8 Indeed, it is reliably rumored that the British offered
to abandon the place in 1967, and this caused instructions to go to
Hong Kong compatriots to tone down their activities. When the
Portuguese sought discussions with the Chinese government on the
rendition of Macao, after their "carnation revolution," in 1974 and
1975, China is thought to have ignored them for fear of upsetting
the stability of Hong Kong. 10 9
Given the British determination in the 1960s not to make
public mention of the future of Hong Kong lest China be provoked

into demanding her sovereign rights, it might be thought somewhat
surprising that MacLehose, now Governor. should have gone to
China in 1979 and raised with Deng Xiaoping-in private but sure
to be leaked-the question of land leases in the New Territories (set
to expire on 27 June 1997). Circumstances were of course now
different, in that expiry of the Peking Convention of 1898 was only
eighteen years away, and fifteen years was regarded by some
(mostly American) lawyers and bankers as a minimum period for
mortgage security. After 1982, it was thought, no one could invest
in New Territories property.
Various accounts of the DengMacLehose interview have been published." 0 and it seems that by
referring to land leases rather than the lease of the New Territories
themselves it was hoped that the central issue could be finessed.
But Deng, either confused or in full understanding, made it clear
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BETRAYAL 29. 305 (rev. ed. 1996) (claiming that the Heath government decided in
1971 or 1972 that Hong Kong would be returned to China.) Of course, it had
been recognized since at least 1943 that eventually there could be no other
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108. "Eventually. Mao vetoed Jiang Qing's plans to reintegrate Hong Kong,
ruling that its strategic importance required that it be left alone for the time
being." HONG KONG! HONG KONG! 198 (1990).
109. After Mao's death in 1976 it is likely that the British raised the
question of Hong Kong's future with Hua Guofeng, perhaps suggesting "that the
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unfettered de facto British administration. Id. at 199. Hua decreed in a 1977
report to the Communist Party that recovery of Hong Kong should not be
mentioned for the "next ten or twenty years or even a considerably longer time so
that Hong Kong and Macau may enjoy a period of relative stability for
development." WILLIAM McGuRN. PERFIDIOUS ALBION: THE ABANDONMENT OF HONG
KONG 1997, 40 (1992).
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that Hong Kong would be recovered, although he did not say
expressly when, 1 1 ' and he added, famously, that investors could
.put their hearts at ease."1 12 Still there was no sign that China
wanted to talk about the future of Hong Kong; only when Britain
urged that discussions be held did China agree and did negotiations
begin. That was in 1982. By 1984, an agreement was signed. one
which arranged for the restoration of the entire colony to China at
the moment the New Territories lease expired.
The Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong
Kong promised "one country, two systems" and a "high degree of
autonomy," maintaining Hong Kong's separate way of life and the
economic, social, and legal systems which sustained it, for fifty
years. Detailed provisions were made in the annexes, and these
were largely incorporated into the Basic Law, the codified

constitution of what will become the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region on July 1, 1997. The manner or process of
transfer of authority from Britain to China has become highly
controversial and the prospect of promises being kept uncertain.
The broad outlines of the future of Hong Kong, however, barring
unexpected calamity, have now been settled.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Britain has always recognized that the ultimate aim of the
Chinese government and people was to reclaim Hong Kong. The
Kuomintang authorities would no doubt have insisted on it before
long if they had remained in power. The communist government,
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According to Percy Cradock. Zhou Enlal

had warned

Malcolm

MacDonald in 1971 that China would recover Hong Kong In 1997.
CRADOCK, EXPERIENCES OF CHINA 162 (1994).
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Mark Robertil writes:

MacLehose and Cradock have been accused of bungling the Initial
attempt to resolve the question of the New Territories lease during
the meeting with Deng Xiaoping in 1979. Some colonial officials In
Hong Kong even believe that these two diplomats deliberately
provoked China into taking back Hong Kong to rid themselves of an

obstacle to better Sino-British relations.

To the contrary - they

made a legitimate effort to keep Hong Kong British. Their mistake
was in over-estimating Deng's grasp of the subtleties of the Issues
involved. Even if they had raised the matter with lower-level cadres
more familiar with Hong Kong, as Executive Councillor Y K Kan
suggested, Deng would never have accepted a British presence in

Hong Kong after 1997. He had decided In 1978 that Hong Kong
and Macao would be recovered under the formula being worked out
for reunification with Taiwan.
ROBERTI, supranote 106, at 305-06.
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however, never even hinted that retrocession was part of their
immediate agenda. Garvey cabled in 1964. "This is partly for the
money, partly because they fear American intervention in any crisis,
perhaps also partly because our presence guarantees against a KIvIT
13
takeover."'
Now, of course, circumstances have changed. China believes
that the "one country, two systems" formula will secure the money.
By the 1980s, the United States was at best a paper tiger when it
came to protecting Hong Kong. There was no risk of resistance from
Taiwan, and China's increasing prosperity and relatively stable
foreign relations, as well as Britain's anxiety in the early 1980s to
deal with the problem, gave China the confidence to absorb Hong
Kong and thus initiate reunification of the motherland.
The future of Hong Kong was once the precarious maintenance

of British authority. It is no longer what it used to be.
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